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MATTHEW G. LAVER*
Western Investment Hedged Partners LP v. Sunset
Financial Resources, Inc.: Exercising Control of
Corporate Machinery through a Manipulative
Democracy
IN WESTERN INVESTMENT HEDGED PARTNERS LP v Sunset Financial Resources, Inc.,'
the Maryland Business & Technology Court addressed a power struggle between
the directors and shareholders of a corporation.2 The court held that corporate
directors are protected against shareholder derivative suits so long as they perform
their duties to the minimum degree required to maintain compliance with the
company's bylaws and articles of incorporation.' While the court attempted to illu-
minate the impact of shifting expectations and responsibilities of corporate direc-
tors, such an explanation came at the expense of minority shareholders and their
already limited ability to influence and enact change. Rather than bolster and sus-
tain the position of lesser stockholders in corporate elections, the court incorrectly
reasoned that the actions of corporate directors are acceptable so long as they are
facially legal.4 Moreover, the court failed to promote the interests of lesser share-
holders and ignored the original purpose of this particular type of business entity,
the real estate investment trust, which was designed to allow smaller investors a
modicum of control in a larger corporate world.' This ruling disturbs the already
tenuous balance of power between directors and small scale shareholders, resulting
in a dramatic and unwarranted shift in the balance of power in favor of corporate
officers.6
J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 2008; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 2004.
1. No. 24-C-05-009540 (Md. Cir. Ct. Baltimore City Mar. 7, 2006).
2. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
3. Id., slip op. at 6-7.
4. Id., slip op. at 5-7.
5. WILLIAM A. KELLEY, JR., REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS HANDBOOK 3 (2d ed. 1998).
6. W. Inv., No. 24-C-05-009540, slip op. at 7.
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I. THE CASE
The Lipson plaintiff group7 ("Lipson") operated its business from Salt Lake City,
Utah, and shared a common business interest in acquiring, holding, and disposing
of investments in various companies Collectively, Lipson owned 1,021,300 shares
of common stock in the defendant company, Sunset Financial Resources, Inc.
("Sunset Financial").9 Specifically, these shares were part of a Maryland Real Estate
Investment Trust (REIT).' Lipson's holdings amounted to 9.7% of Sunset Finan-
cial's total outstanding stock."
On August 27, 2005, Lipson submitted a letter calling for a special meeting of the
stockholders.' 2 The impetus behind Lipson's request was a growing dissatisfaction
with Sunset Financial's management.' The purpose of the proposed meeting was
to remove a majority of the board members and replace them with directors who
shared Lipson's views regarding the direction of the REIT. 4 Subsequently, Sunset
Financial's board of directors amended the company bylaws to increase the number
of shareholders needed to call a special meeting from 25% to 50%.' s
In response to the amendment of the bylaws, Lipson filed a Preliminary Consent
Solicitation Statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) specifi-
cally asking to conduct a special meeting of the company's stockholders to remove
several of the current board members. 6 Sunset Financial then enacted an addi-
tional series of amendments to the bylaws effectively creating more obstacles to
meaningful minority participation in the corporate election process. 7 Believing
that the recent amendments sought to foil its efforts to reshape the board of direc-
tors, Lipson filed a complaint seeking a declaration setting aside the new amend-
ments to the company's bylaws and enjoining their enforcement. 8
7. In addition to the individual, Arthur Lipson, the plaintiff group included two Delaware limited liability
companies and a Delaware limited partnership. Id., slip op. at 1.
8. Id.
9. Id. Sunset Financial was incorporated in the State of Maryland on October 6, 2003 and remains in
good standing according to the Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation as of February 7, 2008. See
Maryland Dep't of Assessments and Taxation, Taxpayer Servs. Div., http://sdatcert3.resiusa.org/UCC-Charter/
(last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
10. W. Inv., No. 24-C-05-009540, slip op. at 1; see infra Part IL.A (discussing the origin of the modern
REIT).
11. W. Inv., No. 24-C-05-009540, slip op. at 1; Sunset Financial reported these figures, 1,021,300 shares of
common stock amounting to 9.7% of the total outstanding common stock, on August 10, 2005. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
15. Id., slip op. at 1.
16. Id.
17. Id. The new amendments altered many facets of the company's bylaws, including the procedure and
time limitations for the board to field requests for special meetings, the procedure for nominating and electing
directors at special meetings, the addition of an advanced payment requirement of certain costs associated with
special meetings, and a provision permitting the secretary to cancel a special meeting up to ten days before the
meeting date if a sufficient number of stockholders revoked their requests for the meeting. Id., slip op. at 3.
18. Id., slip op. at 2.
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Lipson and Sunset Financial attended a scheduling conference and proceeded
with limited discovery. 9 Sunset Financial then filed a motion for summary judg-
ment.2" On March 3, 2006, the Maryland Business & Technology Court heard argu-
ments on the motion to determine the reasonableness of the actions of Sunset
Financial's board of directors and the compatibility of those actions with the scope
of their fiduciary duties as corporate directors. 2' In reaching its decision for the
defendant, the court relied heavily on Delaware case law due to the dearth of rele-
vant Maryland jurisprudence.2
II LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,23 the Delaware Court of Chancery explained
that if it is "to have any validity, [the corporate election process] must be conducted
with scrupulous fairness and without any advantage being conferred or denied" to
any interested party.24 This notion of fairness draws upon pivotal doctrine utilized
within the corporate world-namely a corporate director's fiduciary duty to the
shareholders of the corporation. 2' Fairness, however, is reciprocal and also serves to
protect directors from the frivolous claims of shareholders by shielding them with
the business judgment rule.26 These doctrines must be framed against the history
and purpose of the REIT in order to determine the appropriate balance of power
between directors and shareholders within the context of corporate REITs.
A. Real Estate Investment Trusts
The modern REIT is vastly different than its precursor, the common law business
trust.27 Historically, common law business trusts allowed groups of investors to
pool their resources and invest in real estate as a collective unit.28 These trusts were
especially appealing because they provided valuable incentives for investors, such as
exemptions from state statutory restrictions on corporate investment in real estate
and tax benefits. 29 In 1935, however, the Supreme Court of the United States held
in Morrissey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that such trusts were virtually
indistinguishable from corporations and were not exempt from corporate tax re-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id., slip op. at 4.
23. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
24. Id. at 661.
25. ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 379 (2006).
26. Id. at 426.
27. KELLEY, supra note 5, at 1-2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2. Specifically, common law business trusts "were not taxed on trust income currently distributed
to the beneficial owners." Id. The common law business trust also provided corporations with other beneficial
tax breaks which heightened the attractiveness of this form of investment. Id.
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quirements ° This decision directly lead to a shift in business law wherein REITs
were no longer formed as common law business trusts, but rather took on the
corporate form or the partnership form." This significant change resulted in ad-
verse consequences for small time investors, such as REIT owners, who could not
afford to operate within the fast-moving, expensive corporate world. 2
Following the Morrissey decision, and in the wake of World War II, Congress
attempted to reclassify the status of REITs and allow their owners similar benefits to
those previously available.33 This effort was thwarted by President Eisenhower in
1956 for numerous reasons, among them, "[plermitting REITs to avoid payment of
the corporate tax might be availed of by existing real estate corporations, thereby
depriving the Treasury of substantial revenue." 4 Despite this adverse presidential
veto, Congress pushed forward with a new bill in 1960 that laid out clear terms for
who would qualify for REIT tax treatment, with corporations specifically ex-
cluded.3" With President Eisenhower's approval, and the Treasury Department's
withdrawal of its earlier objections, a new type of REIT came to life.36
The new formation openly barred all corporations from identifying themselves
as investment trusts, instead focusing tax benefits upon low level investors who
could now "enjoy advantages that were available under prior law only to those with
larger resources."37 These advantages included "spreading the risk of loss by the
greater diversification of investment that can be obtained through the pooling of
investments," as well as affording small time investors a chance to participate in
investment projects that were beyond their capability on an individual level.3
Hence, REITs can be operated as corporations, but they are not like other corpora-
tions; they must leave their opportunities open to investors and distribute their
gains in order to maintain their legal classification as REITs 9
Since 1960, the REIT has continued to be shaped through a series of federal
enactments, including the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Revenue Act of 1997.40
However, many of these modifications were technical in nature, and if anything,
did very little to alter the scope of the REIT benefits for small scale investors.4 In
spite of the Morrissey decision and the ensuing shifts in business law, the purpose
of the REIT was, and still is, the result of a congressional effort to "give the small
30. 296 U.S. 344, 361-62 (1935).
31. KELLEY, supra note 5, at 2.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id.
34. id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3-4.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 3-4.
39. Chadwick M. Cornell, Reits and Upreits: Pushing the Corporate Law Envelope, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1565,
1572 (1997).
40. KELLEY, supra note 5, at 4-8.
41. See generally id.
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investor an opportunity to invest in real estate similar to the opportunity he had to
invest in mutual funds."42 It is against this evolving backdrop of burdens and bene-
fits that REITs and their shareholders operate.
B. The Deferential Business Judgment Rule and its Relationship to Corporate
Governance
Judicial reluctance to second guess decisions by directors with respect to their busi-
ness conduct can be traced back over 250 years.43 This hesitation to interfere with
corporate decision-making occurs for a variety of reasons, including the
"[riecognition of the possibility of error and the need to apply a relaxed standard
before imposing liability so as to maintain the pool of potential directors."44 In
addition, courts demonstrate an unwillingness to overstep their judicial limits con-
cerning directors by encouraging the "efficient acceptance of risk."4 Finally, courts
defer to corporate decision-making because "directors are, in most cases, more
qualified to make business decisions than are judges." 6 Unfortunately for share-
holders, these policy-based rationales encourage the judiciary to adhere to a rule
designed to promote fairness, but instead sparks further imbalance through its
strong veil of protection.
One of the primary problems with analyzing a director's actions within the scope
of their corporate duties is that it is often difficult to determine when self-interest
has affected the decisions of management.47 This murky territory has the potential
to severely complicate the already difficult role of directors, subject directors to
harsh scrutiny from shareholders, and expose directors to shareholder derivative
suits for their actions.48 Courts and corporations have reacted by defaulting to and
relying upon the protections of the business judgment rule-specifically, the "pre-
sumption that in making a business decision[,] the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company."49 Unless there is a clear and palpable
abuse of discretion, the actions of corporate directors enjoy a presumption of
reasonableness. 0
42. Don Augustine, Real Estate Investment Trusts: The Big Picture, in PRACTISING L. INST., REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENT TRUSTS 1 (Jim McCord & Robert Oziel eds., 1970).
43. DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 9 (5th ed. 1998).
44. Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty of Finest Loyalty and Reasonable Decisions: The
Business Judgment Rule in Unincorporated Business Organizations?, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 350 (2005).
45. Id.
46. Int'l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (11th Cir. 1989).
47. See generally CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 25, at 425-26.
48. Id. at 425.
49. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124
(Del. Ch. 1971)).
50. Id.
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Percy v. Millaudon,s l an 1829 case before the Louisiana Supreme Court, is widely
considered to be one of the first decisions that specifically emphasized issues em-
blematic of the business judgment rule.12 In Percy, the court considered a claim
stating that directors of a corporation were liable for numerous acts of self-interest,
including "fraudulent and unfaithful conduct" resulting in $451,000 of debt to the
corporation.53 The defendant directors, in response to these allegations, averred
that "if in all the acts complained of, any be true, they were the acts of the whole
board of directors, done and made in good faith, and free from bad and corruptintention. ""4
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that it is of great importance to the
public that the agents to whom their direction is entrusted "should be protected
while they act faithfully."55 Moreover, the court noted that "[t] here is not a scintilla
of evidence that the defendants had any knowledge of ... misconduct in this par-
ticular."56 As a result of this conclusion, the directors were shielded from liability. 7
The Percy decision was likely the first in a long series of opinions that have
formulated the modern business judgment rule. 8 In 1984, the rule was consoli-
dated by the landmark decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v.
Lewis. 9 In Aronson, a group of directors was accused of self-interest relating to an
employment agreement that granted immense benefits to a seventy-five year old
former director." Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the employment agreement
lacked a valid business purpose, was a waste of corporate assets, and that the agreed
upon compensation was grossly excessive in light of the scant services provided by
the elderly director.6' After review, the court issued a declaration that has since
become widely accepted as a presumption of directorial good faith and loyalty that
shields corporate officers from legal action unless countered with particularized
facts showing breach of fiduciary duty.62 The court expressly stated "[t]he business
and affairs of a corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors.. ."and "[t]he business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of
51. 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829).
52. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 43, at 9.
53. Percy, 8 Mart. (n.s.) at 68. These claims were based on the charge that the directors allowed the
president and cashier of the company to discount notes from the fund without the required unanimous direc-
torial consent. Id. Additionally, plaintiff charged that the directors "fraudulently reported the [state of the
company] cash to be correct, whereas in truth it was not so; but there was a deficiency of $49,000." Id. at 70.
54. Id. at 72.
55. Id. at 73.
56. id. at 80.
57. Id.
58. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 43, at 9.
59. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
60. Id. at 808-09.
61. id. at 809.
62. Id. at 811. This presumption is reiterated many times in Delaware case law following Aronson. BLOCK
ET AL., supra note 43, at 20.
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the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors."63 With this strong assertion, the
court defended the actions of corporate directors by offering them the umbrella
protections of the business judgment rule.
Shortly after the Aronson decision, the Delaware Supreme Court again addressed
the business judgment rule in Unocal v. Mesa." In Unocal, a corporation's directors
deterred a minority shareholder's hostile takeover by making a self-tender offer.6"
The minority shareholder reacted to this defensive tactic by suing the corporation's
directors, arguing they had breached their fiduciary duties to him as a shareholder,
as evidenced by the fact that the corporation's directors stood to benefit from the
self-tender offer." While there can be no question, the court stated, that directors
must act loyally to the companies they represent, "[tihere is no obligation of self-
sacrifice by a corporation and its shareholders," in the face of a perceived harm
such as the attempted takeover coordinated by the minority shareholder.67 As such,
the court held that the directors had acted in what they believed to be the best
interests of the corporation. The court elaborated that it would not substitute its
judgment for that of the board of directors unless it can be shown "by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the directors' decisions were primarily based on perpetu-
ating themselves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud,
overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uninformed."6 Accordingly, the Delaware
Supreme Court applied the protections of the business judgment rule in defense of
the Unocal directors.69
These cases illustrate the important balance within which directors must operate
and the intense scrutiny to which they are subjected. As a result of this environ-
ment, directors are afforded the protection of the business judgment rule. How-
ever, if it is determined that a director has indeed breached his obligatory fiduciary
duties, the director will not be shielded from liability and may face a variety of
consequences, including, but not limited to, forced transfer of his corporate owner-
ship interest back to the company, monetary restitution, and attorney's fees.7" Ulti-
mately, past jurisprudence shows that so long as corporate directors adhere to their
mandated fiduciary duties, the business judgment rule will protect them from
shareholder challenges.
63. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12.
64. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
65. Id. at 951-53.
66. Id. at 958.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. HMG/Courtland Props., Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 122-25 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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C. The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty Held by Corporate Directors
The success or failure of a corporation frequently hinges upon good faith dealings
by directors with shareholders and the manner in which directors operate, both
within the company and in outside transactions.7 ' The Delaware Court of Chancery
echoed this sentiment by explaining that "[i]t is fundamental that directors stand in
a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its shareholders, and that their primary
duty is to deal fairly and justly."72 Courts agree that the preeminent duty a director
holds with respect to shareholders is a duty of loyalty.73
In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,74 the court stated that the duty of loyalty
specifically "mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders
takes precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling
shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally."75 Further, this duty re-
quires an "undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation [that] demands that
there be no conflict between duty and self-interest."76 The Cede court went on to
provide examples of a director allowing self-interests to supersede his commitment
to a corporation by referencing instances where a director appears on both sides of
a business transaction or a director receives a personal benefit from a transaction
that the general stockholder does not receive.77 For the most part, courts have de-
termined that a director does not violate the duty of loyalty when he or she acts or
makes a decision that is based exclusively on the corporate merits of the decision
rather than a personal or extraneous consideration.7
The Delaware Court of Chancery propounded the idea of attacking the abuse of
corporate power in Bowen v. Imperial Theatres,79 where certain corporate directors
transferred shares of the company to themselves for no consideration."0 The Bowen
court delved into the heart of the issue when it stated, "the material and controlling
circumstance is that the directors in whose control the company's stock was vested
as its trustees, gave it to themselves for nothing in pursuance of a deliberate plan to
retain control over its affairs," and asserted that such conduct is nothing less than"reprehensible."'" In response to this transaction, the court concluded that the de-
ception was especially "gross" in light of how the directors flagrantly violated their
71. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del. Ch. 1967).
72. Id.
73. CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 25, at 380. In addition to the fiduciary duty of loyalty, directors also must
adhere to the fiduciary duty of care. Id. at 406. This duty requires the director to perform his duties with the
care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. Id.
74. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
75. Id. at 361 (citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 362.
78. Id.
79. 115 A. 918 (Del. Ch. 1922).
80. Id. at 921.
81. Id. at 922.
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fiduciary duty of loyalty.s2 The court also concluded that corporate directors can-
not, "in violation of their trust, take action which profits themselves, and then by a
formula of their own making close the lips of the corporation against future
objection." 3
Despite its extremely powerful protection, shareholders are not powerless against
the shield of the business judgment rule because "[tihe machinery of corporate
democracy and the derivative suit are potent tools to redress the conduct of a tor-
pid or unfaithful management." 4 Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc."5 provides a
keen illustration of this principle. In Schnell, the court held that corporate manage-
ment breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty by manipulating the corporate machin-
ery for its own self-interests.8 6 Specifically, the court ruled that "management ha[d]
attempted to utilize the corporate machinery ... for the purpose of perpetuating
itself in office; and ...for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of
dissident stockholders in the exercise of their rights."8 " The court reached this con-
clusion as a result of the defendant managers' electoral entrenchment tactics, in-
cluding "the hiring of two established proxy solicitors as well as a refusal to produce
a list of its stockholders" in addition to severely limiting the window in which to
wage a successful proxy fight.88
More tellingly, the Maryland Business and Technology Court also considered a
director's fiduciary duty of loyalty in Shaker v. Foxby Corp.,9 where it applied key
Delaware decisions like Schnell. In Shaker, the court denied a corporate board of
directors' motion to dismiss the complaint, reasoning that the board likely violated
company bylaws in a manner that detrimentally impacted the stockholders' ability
to participate in the corporate election process.9" Specifically, the court was per-
suaded by the plaintiffs assertion that "the facially inoffensive [electoral] notice
provisions were enforced in this case in a discriminatory fashion," which primarily
served the interests of the corporate board at the expense of the shareholders.9'
Elaborating on this sentiment, the court explained that the board was seemingly in
violation of the corporation's fiduciary duty of loyalty to the shareholders because
82. Id. at 921-22.
83. Id. at 922. This statement was made in response to the director's attempts to cover up their actions by
fraudulently marking the shares in question as fully paid for so as to deflect inquiries into the sale and their
conduct. Id.
84. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
85. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
86. Id. at 439.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. No. 24-C-04-007613 (Md. Cir. Ct. Baltimore City Mar. 15, 2005).
90. See id. In Shaker, the plaintiff was timely notified that one director position would be open for election
during the proxy season. Id., slip op. at 3. However, the corporate directors then decided to add two additional
director positions to the ballot, and left plaintiff with only ten days to present an alternative candidate slate. Id.
This late change to the election agenda gave the plaintiff little time to prepare for a proxy contest, and resulted
in the subsequent lawsuit for breach of the duty of loyalty. Id.
91. Id., slip op. at 4-5.
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the primary purpose of its actions was to prevent the effectiveness of a shareholder
vote.92 Ultimately, the court remanded the case for further discovery, but not with-
out allowing for the possibility that the directors had committed a breach of their
fiduciary duty of loyalty as a direct result of their active attempts to stymie the
minority shareholder's voting efforts."
These cases illustrate the importance of the duty of loyalty and the dire conse-
quences that ensue if directors act in a manner outside the scope of their assigned
duties. Courts have very clearly indicated that "[c] orporate directors cannot manip-
ulate the property, of which they have control in a trust character," for any per-
sonal interest." If directors find themselves on the wrong side of this rigid
standard, then they will not have the benefit of the business judgment rule's protec-
tions because their actions will not reflect, "a fair exercise in good faith of the
power with which they are clothed.""5
III. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S REASONING
In Western Investment, the Maryland Business & Technology Court issued a ruling
in favor of Sunset Financial, indicating that corporate directors are free from liabil-
ity if they act and make decisions that are facially valid and within the scope of the
corporations' bylaws.96 In the opinion, the court explained this conclusion by ap-
plying the business judgment rule and examining the legality of the amended
bylaws.97
The court began its analysis by examining Sunset Financial's two primary adjust-
ments to its bylaws.9 The first change increased the percentage of stockholders
required to call a special meeting from a 25% minority interest to a simple majority
interest of 50%. 99 The second bylaw amendment was far more sweeping, changing
the time limitations for the board to set dates for special meetings.00 These amend-
ments affected the procedures for nominating and electing directors in addition to
adding a procedure by which the secretary of the corporation had the power to
cancel special meetings up to ten days before the meeting date.'' The court sought
to determine whether the changes were, as Lipson contended, an unlawful defense
mechanism to stymie its efforts to influence corporate elections, or as Sunset Fi-
nancial asserted, an extension and clarification of the existing bylaws.' 2
92. Id., slip op. at 5.
93. Id., slip op. at 11.
94. Elliott v. Baker, 80 N.E. 450, 452 (Mass. 1907).
95. Id.
96. No. 24-C-05-009540, slip op. at 7 (Md. Cir. Ct. Baltimore City Mar. 7, 2006).
97. Id., slip op. at 2-7.
98. Id., slip op. at 2-4.
99. Id., slip op. at 3.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id., slip op. at 4.
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To analyze these changes, the court examined the guiding principles of Schnell v.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.' °3 and Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp."4 The court
explained that these cases stand for the general proposition that "the deferential
business judgment rule is not applicable to board actions taken for the primary
purpose of interfering with the stockholder's vote, even if taken advisedly and in
good faith."'0' Additionally, the court recited the familiar axiom that the directors
of a Maryland corporation owe their stockholders a fiduciary duty of loyalty.0 6 The
court concluded, however, that a shareholder's right to take part in the corporate
election process does not supersede good faith actions of corporate directors even
when they unilaterally diminish shareholder influence in elections.' 7
In addition to these competing interests, the court explained that perhaps the
most compelling statement made by either party was the simple fact that
"[p]laintiffs here concede that the August 31, 2005 by-law amendment [altering the
number of stockholders needed to call a special meeting] is facially lawful."'00
Moreover, the court noted that Lipson was "hard-pressed to contend that any of the
October 5, 2005 by-law amendments [further altering the procedure and time limi-
tations for requesting a special meeting], viewed independently, would be found to
be unreasonable exercises of the board's authority."'0 9 In light of these conclusions,
the court found it difficult to accept Lipson's argument that the bylaw amendments
were enacted for the purpose of confounding efforts to influence the election pro-
cess."0 Further, the court discovered little evidence indicating that Sunset Financial
actively sought to create barriers to impede Lipson's proposals."' As a result of
these inadequacies in Lipson's argument, the court determined that the directors'
actions did not create unfair obstacles to the exercise of Lipson's rights as a share-
holder." 2 Instead, the court concluded that "[t]he directors acted in good faith and
[would] not be held accountable for any unintended violations of their duties to
the stockholders."' ' 3
Finally, the court addressed Lipson's specific claim that the bylaw amendments
amounted to strategic defense mechanisms enacted to bar the plaintiffs from call-
103. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
104. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
105. W. Inv., No. 24-C-05-009540, slip op. at 4.
106. Id., slip op. at 4-5.
107. Id., slip op. at 5.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id., slip op. at 5-6.
111. Id. Additionally, the court explained that in this case, both parties had the opportunity to partake in
discovery, and despite this process, Lipson still offered little support in the record to substantiate its claims of
misconduct on the part of Sunset Financial. Id. To the contrary, Lipson "testified that [it] would not anticipate
any difficulty in complying with the simple majority by-law amendment enacted on August 31, 2005." Id., slip
op. at 6.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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ing a special meeting to elect new corporate directors." 4 The court, rejecting this
argument, concluded that the amendments were "necessary provisions wholly lack-
ing in the original corporate by-laws and necessary to establish appropriate proce-
dures for conducting special meetings of stockholders," rather than a corporate
defense mechanism." 5 The court stressed that one of the bylaw amendments, the
secretary's power to cancel meetings, was not, in fact, a new addition to the corpo-
rate bylaws, but rather always had existed and simply was being clarified." 6 Based
on this reasoning, the court granted summary judgment to Sunset Financial on the
grounds that, as a matter of law, the director's actions were not implicit attempts to
usurp control from the stockholders and that the bylaw amendments were not
invalid." 7
IV. ANALYSIS
In Western Investment, the court ruled that the actions of corporate directors essen-
tially were impervious to legal claims, so long as those actions were facially valid."'
In reaching its decision, the court ignored settled principles that indicate a need for
balance of corporate power between directors and shareholders, particularly with
respect to corporate elections."9 As a result, the court unacceptably reduced the
already limited ability of minority shareholders to adequately protect their own
investment in the corporation.
A. Strict Legality of the Director's Actions vs. the Rights of the Stockholder
In Schnell, the court stated that "inequitable action does not become permissible
simply because it is legally possible."'2 0 When the court in Western Investment ruled
that the directors had acted appropriately in amending Sunset Financial's bylaws
because such amendments were facially legal,' 2' it ignored the important admoni-
tions of Schnell that explicitly established that facially valid actions do not necessa-
rily amount to actions congruent with a director's fiduciary obligations.'22 While
the conduct of Sunset Financial's corporate board may have been facially legal, it is
equally undeniable that these same actions constituted concrete obstacles to Lip-
son's purposes-namely influencing the corporate electoral process.
Additionally, the facts of Schnell are strikingly similar to the fact pattern in West-
ern Investment, as Schnell dealt with a corporate election that was affected drasti-
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id., slip op. at 6-7.
118. Id., slip op. at 7.
119. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
120. Id.
121. W. Inv., No. 24-C-05-009540, slip op. at 7.
122. Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439.
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cally by amendments to long-standing corporate bylaws. 23 Specifically, the
directors in Schnell did not provide a list of all stockholders to the minority group
seeking to campaign for positions on the directorial board. 2 ' These directors also
changed the date of the annual meeting in a manner that hindered the minority
group's campaign efforts.'25 As a result, the court held that management had at-
tempted to utilize corporate machinery for the purpose of entrenching themselves
in office in violation of established principles of corporate governance.'26
The directors of Sunset Financial, in a similar fashion, while not changing the
date of the proposed meeting, changed the manner of arranging special meetings
by amending the bylaws to require the approval of 50%, rather than 25%, of the
stockholders. 27 In failing to recognize Sunset Financial's plainly obstructive actions,
the court improperly weakened the influence that a minority shareholder may have
on a corporation. The degree to which Sunset Financial tried to limit Lipson's
influence extended beyond the realm of reasonableness and created a situation that
was "contrary to established principles of corporate democracy."2'
While the traditional standards of corporate democracy grant deference to the
decisions and actions of corporate directors, a balance of power is still an essential
component for a successful relationship between directors and investors.'29 Direc-
tors are equipped with wide latitude to serve the corporation as they see fit, and
this discretion is protected by the business judgment rule. 3 ° In particular, this
shield exists to ensure that minority shareholders do not unduly influence the cor-
porate machinery though frivolous claims against management by instilling a"powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the [corporate] directors. '
Despite this broad protection, minority shareholders wield some real power, as
recognized by state courts and encouraged by federal regulatory agencies. For ex-
ample, the SEC has adopted certain amendments to the federal proxy rules in an
effort to "foster shareholder communication and remove unnecessary limitations
on shareholders' use of their voting rights."'32 Ultimately, while directors need
broad corporate control in order to take the risks necessary to operate a profitable
business, there is a palpable distinction between broad control and absolute
control.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. W. Inv. Hedged Partners LP, v. Sunset Fin. Res., Inc., No. 24-C-05-009540, slip op. at 2-3 (Md. Cir.
Ct. Baltimore City Mar. 7, 2006).
128. Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439.
129. Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate Govern-
ance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 384-85 (1994).
130. Id. at 391-92.
131. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
132. Goforth, supra note 129, at 395.
VOL. 3 NO. 2 2008
EXERCISING CONTROL OF CORPORATE MACHINERY
Shaker elaborated upon this notion by reiterating the principle that mere lawful
acts do not always constitute what is best for a corporation and its shareholders.'
Shaker unequivocally stands for the proposition that there must be balance between
directors and shareholders, particularly "with respect to [matters] of internal cor-
porate governance."' 14 The court further stated "those in charge of the election
machinery of a corporation must be held to the highest standards of providing for
and conducting corporate elections," and therefore, the business judgment rule will
be diluted to an extent as a means of ensuring an equitable voting procedure. 3 '
Based on this conclusion, the court ruled that despite the facially legal actions of
the directors, their decisions apparently had leveraged control away from the share-
holders and unreasonably altered the balance between director and shareholder.'36
These cases emphasize the importance of the corporate election process and the
absolute need for scrupulous fairness. By overlooking the holdings outlined in
Schnell and Shaker, which assert a need for balance, the Western Investment court
undermined the influence of Lipson and the minority group based on its conclu-
sion that facially valid actions equate to acceptable conduct. Merely because direc-
tors act legally does not mean that their actions are synonymous with the best
interests of the corporation. In Shaker, the directors may have behaved within the
technical guidelines of their leadership roles, but, as the plaintiff contended, their
underlying intentions were to stymie shareholder voting power.' Likewise, in
Schnell, the court held that while the directors adhered to a valid portion of Dela-
ware Corporation Law, such reliance was "contrary to established principles of cor-
porate democracy" and therefore "may not be permitted to stand."'38 Both Shaker
and Schnell appear strikingly similar to Western Investment in that corporate man-
agement affected a series of changes to voting procedure in a manner that ulti-
mately would hinder the efforts of minority shareholders. Based upon a series of
facts that are nearly identical, one might wonder how the Western Investment court
reached a decision that was so radically dissimilar.
B. Without Loyalty the Corporate Structure Crumbles
If corporate directors possessed the authority to make decisions and to act in a
manner that primarily served their personal interests, the "system of business cor-
porations by which so large a part of the world's work is now conducted may
become a system of frauds.""' Directors of corporations act in a fiduciary capacity,
133. See generally No. 24-C 04-007613 (Md. Cir. Ct. Baltimore City Mar. 15, 2005).
134. Id., slip op. at 11.
135. Id., slip op. at 9 (quoting Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (Del. Ch. 1987)).
136. Id., slip op. at 9-11. As a result of this decision, the court remanded the case for further discovery. Id.,
slip op. at 11. In particular, the court wanted to learn more about the director's actions in relation to "[tihe
reasonableness and/or the discriminatory effect of the by-law amendments." Id.
137. Id., slip op. at 3.
138. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
139. Elliott v. Baker, 80 N.E. 450, 452 (Mass. 1907).
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and their "office is one of trust and they are held to the high standard of duty
required of trustees."' 4 Directors have the inherent power to make decisions and to
control the future of a corporation. 4' Such power, however, is not a blank check
that allows them to make decisions to suit their own fancy while ignoring minority
interests.42
The Delaware Court of Chancery, in Bowen v. Imperial Theatres,'43 limited direc-
torial control when it ruled against a group of directors that had violated their duty
of loyalty through self-interest.'44 This ruling is directly relevant to the matter at
hand because the court allowed Sunset Financial to pass amendments that implic-
itly benefited the existing board of directors by hindering Lipson's efforts to call a
special meeting to enact an electoral change. 4 ' Further, Western Investment effec-
tively makes it more difficult for minority shareholders like Lipson to enact change
because it allows the company directors to alter the way special meetings are ar-
ranged during the initiation process.'46 In doing this, the court committed the very
transgression that the Bowen court warned against, namely permitting directors to
act for their own benefit, while at the same time erecting virtually insurmountable
hurdles to prevent challenges to their supremacy."' While there is certainly a dis-
tinction between the obvious tangible benefits the directors received in Bowen
through their self-interested transfer of stock and the entrenchment of power that
the directors sought in Western Investment, the end result was nearly identical-
both the directors in Bowen and Western Investment acted primarily for the purpose
of preserving their own interests as opposed to furthering the interests of the
company.
In addition, it is difficult to comprehend the application of a protective veil for
the Sunset Financial directors when compared to past cases in which the business
judgment rule has been applied. In Unocal v. Mesa, the Delaware Supreme Court
determined that corporations and their representative directors are not obligated to
sacrifice the company and their own personal well-being in the face of threatening
takeover attempts. 4 ' However, the Unocal court qualified this blanket statement by
instructing that it would have to carefully consider the application of the business
judgment rule if the shareholders demonstrated that the directors acted primarily
to perpetuate their terms in office.'49 Western Investment presents a series of facts
140. Id.
141. Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 635 A.2d 394, 407 (Md. 1994).
142. Elliott, 80 N.E. at 452.
143. 115 A. 918 (Del. Ch. 1922).
144. Id. at 921.
145. W. Inv. Hedged Partners LP, v. Sunset Fin. Res., Inc., No. 24-C-05-009540, slip op. at 7 (Md. Cir. Ct.
Baltimore City Mar. 7, 2006).
146. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
147. Bowen, 115 A. at 922.
148. 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).
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and actions ripe for close review, especially considering that the outcome of the
case allowed a group of directors to remain in near absolute control of the corpo-
rate machinery and the election process. The lessons of Unocal and Bowen hinge
upon shared balance, the type that does not appear to exist in the Sunset Financial
Corporation.
C. The Purpose of the REIT in Relation to Small Scale Investors
In addition to issues concerning the legality of Sunset Financial's directors' actions
and fiduciary duties, the Western Investment court overlooked the primary purpose
of the REIT and perhaps the strongest argument in support of Lipson's claims:
REITs give "small investors the opportunity to invest in real estate."'50 Specifically,
REITs were created to encourage "small investors to participate in the type of real
estate investments that were traditionally available only to institutions or wealthy
individuals.'. Congress attempted to achieve this general policy initiative of
broadening the base of investors in the wider business world by providing tax based
benefits that promote participation by individuals without vast wealth. 2
Despite this foundational policy of increasing the involvement and influence of
non-traditional investors, the Western Investment court still ruled in favor of in-
creased directorial power. Rather than preserve the original objectives of the REIT,
the court weakened this form of investment for all small scale investors. Unfortu-
nately for Lipson, the court failed to recognize the importance of protecting the
investments of individuals and turned a blind eye to the long history that has
shaped the REIT, including the congressional push to establish a strong form of
investment for financially limited individuals.5 3 Moreover, the court neglected to
consider the value of financially diverse investors in a world that is continually
catering to corporations and ignoring individual shareholders.'54 While the REIT
was not designed to wrest control away from directors, its original purpose was to
grant average citizens an opportunity to invest their money and have a voice in a
realm traditionally dominated by powerful and immoveable corporations. The
court's holding in Western Investment is directly contrary to this purpose.
150. Cornell, supra note 39, at 1571.
151. Id. at 1569.
152. Id.
Organizations that operate as REITs do not have to pay federal tax on income or gains and can opt to
pass their income through to shareholders. REIT investors also enjoy the advantages of limited liabil-
ity and transferability of shares (i.e., liquidity) that a corporate structure offers, without incurring the
costs of double taxation. Thus, a REIT is essentially a combination of a corporation and a partner-
ship in that it combines the benefits of a corporation with the pass-through nature of a partnership.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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V. CONCLUSION
The court's ruling in Western Investment likely will have negative implications for
the future of Maryland corporations and REITs in particular. Essentially, the court
provided too much discretion for corporate directors to dictate the terms of corpo-
rate elections, widening the power gap between management and shareholders. The
court has ruled in this fashion based on a superficial viewpoint of the law, rather
than considering its substance and the corporate director's fiduciary obligations to
his or her stockholders. Moreover, this decision ignores the initial purpose of a
REIT, which is to allow smaller investors a semblance of control within the larger
corporate world. 5 Unfortunately, the seemingly invincible power of a corporate
director has been used to manipulate the election process and has tilted the balance
between corporate directors and shareholders beyond a reasonable level.
155. KELLEY, supra note 5, at 2.
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